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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
COMMUNIST CHINA'S CIVIL AVIATION: 1950-1968*
By HARRIETT E. PORCH
I. INTRODUCTIONO F THE MANY state-owned airlines throughout the world none seems
as intriguing at the moment as the one belonging to Communist
China. Perhaps it is the current happenings in China or the general
mystique of the Far East that gives wide readership to everything about
that country, but to students of law and transportation, the operation of
China's civil aviation is especially interesting. Its recent shift of control
from civil to military, together with its wide responsibility for different
types of services, its problems of acquiring equipment, and its generally
slow growth make it unique among the world's airlines.
In most communist states, civil air transportation is an important seg-
ment of the planned economy and its growth follows that of the state's
needs. In Communist China, however, it is difficult to determine whether
or not air transport policies have consciously been a part of industrial
growth and locational planning. Passenger and cargo services have, first
of all, been aimed at completing the communication link between provincial
capitols (although Tibet and Fujian still do not have scheduled service).
Further expansion has tended to establish long-distance scheduled routes to
large population centers and not necessarily to new industrial centers.
Because of the scantiness of information coming out of Communist China
since 1958 it is impossible to present a complete picture of Chinese civil
aviation. All that can be attempted here is to satisfy some of the curiosity
of the Western reader. The following discussion attempts to give some-
thing of the background of the present airline, and to detail as much as
possible its routes, operations, and special services. Regrettably, the reader
may have as many questions when he finishes as when he began; it is only
hoped that this study will provide him with somewhat more information.
II. THE POST-WAR PICTURE
At the end of the war between the Nationalists and the Communists,
aviation on the Mainland of China was in a state of complete disarray.
*This research is supported by the United States Air Force under Project RAND-Contract
No. F44620-67-C-0045-monitored by the Directorate of Operational Requirements and Develop-
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Most of the airfields, airports, and navigational aids had been damaged or
destroyed. The airlines had ceased operations altogether as only 17 opera-
tional transport planes were available and there was little maintenance
equipment and few spare parts for their reconditioning. Aviation fuel was
extremely scarce. Finally, the scarcity of trained personnel severely
restricted aviation's recovery. Before the Communist takeover, 47 percent
of the pilots serving in China's civil aviation were Americans. Many of
the Chinese crews of the 71 planes detained in Hong Kong (while owner-
ship of the planes was being determined) refused to return to the Main-
land and sought employment elsewhere.
Although the value of civil aviation was acknowledged in 1949, more
pressing problems than restoring air transportation faced the Communist
government, and little effort was made to put the airline back on its feet
until the spring of 1950. At that time, with Soviet assistance, a Civil Avia-
tion Bureau (CAB) was established to oversee the provision of air trans-
port services. The CAB was nominally under the Ministry of Communica-
tions, but was actually controlled by the military (People's Revolutionary
Military Committee and its successor, the People's National Defense Coun-
cil) until about 1954.
Two separate aircarrier companies were established in 1950:
(1) Sovetsko-Kitaysko Aksionernoe Obshestvo Grazhdanskoi Aviatsii
(SKOGA) was a jointly owned Sino-Soviet company, 50 percent owned
by each government. (This form of Soviet assistance follows the pattern
laid down with the European Soviet Bloc countries to assist them in recon-
structing their airlines after World War II.) The Soviets furnished Li-2,
11-12, and 11-14 transports (which carry 15 to 32 passengers), maintenance
equipment, spare parts, and pilots. The Chinese furnished a few planes plus
most of the ground crews, co-pilots, and radio operators. A limited number
of Chinese students were sent to the Soviet Union for training as aero-
nautical engineers and designers.
(2) China Civil Aviation Corporation (CCAC) was owned completely
by the Communist Chinese government. It began scheduled operations in
August 1950 between Peking and Chunking, but most of its flights were
nonscheduled operations in support of the military. CCAC had about 26
United States-built aircraft (only about half of which were operable) that
had been abandoned by previous Chinese air carriers. It later obtained
most of the planes that had been detained in Hong Kong. During the
period from about 1951 to 1956, most of the original domestic air routes
were re-established and international routes to the USSR, Burma, and
North Vietnam were begun on a scheduled basis.
In July 1952, the CAB abolished CCAC and established a new company,
the Chinese People's Aviation Corporation, which then flew most of the
domestic routes. In March 1954, the CAB abolished this corporation and
took over its assets directly, operating the services in the east and south of
Mainland China. SKOGA continued to operate across the north and in
the west.
The following year, the Chinese people undertook their first Five-Year
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Plan for development of their economy. Civil aviation was given new
tasks: to broaden communication between the capitol and important cities
in the provinces and in surrounding regions, and simultaneously, to develop
special purpose aviation to serve the agricultural and forest industries, for
geologic exploration, and for express and emergency flights.
During 1954 a new Chinese People's Congress was elected, and there
were certain shifts in internal authority. In aviation, the CAB became the
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) and was put under the
direct control of the Ministry of Communication. In October, SKOGA
was dissolved and the Soviet interest was transferred to the Chinese. What
concessions.or payments were involved in this transaction are not known.
By the end of the year, CAAC had taken over SKOGA's planes and opera-
tions, integrating all services and routes into a single state-owned airline.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL AVIATION
The planning, supervision, and direction of each type of transportation
in Mainland China are handled by an administration, a ministry, or a
bureau. The administrative control of CAAC, as far as government policy
was concerned, was shuffled back and forth several times from the Bureau
of Industry and Communications to the State Council Finally, in 1962,
it was placed directly under the State Council, where it has remained. The
agency was raised to general bureau status (higher than a ministry) and
is now called the General Bureau of Civil Aviation (GBCA). This reorgani-
zation probably did not cause any changes in the internal organization
except to strengthen certain departments, such as international routes, and
define directorate and department responsibilities more carefully. The
GBCA can be viewed more like a combination of the United States Fed-
eral Aviation Administration and the Civil Aeronautics Board, while
CAAC is the operating airline. In fact, there is no "shorthand" name for
the airline, but for reference purposes the international timetables still use
CAAC. Neither GBCA nor CAAC appears on the airline's planes, but
rather four Chinese characters that stand for "China Civil Aviation."
The first indication that reactions to the Cultural Revolution might put
the airline in jeopardy was a quiet announcement in late January 1967. A
Japanese correspondent spotted a wall poster saying merely, "People's
Liberation Army takes over civil aviation." Wall posters are not always
accurate, nor do they give any concrete economic news, but the economic
and military import of this one demanded more information. The reporter
tracking it down found that seizure had been ordered by the State Council
and the Military Commission of the Communist Party Central on January
26. The reasons were "to protect normal flights and to prepare for war."
Nervous over the disruption in all transportation, especially the rail service
between Shanghai and Peking, the Party was probably trying to avoid a
national interruption of airline service. Tight control of the airports no
doubt served to discourage rampaging Red Guards from damaging prop-
' The State Council, center of day-to-day government administration, is analogous to the Council
of Ministers of the USSR.
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erty and equipment or harassing international flights. There is some con-
flicting evidence as to who is running the airline, but most reports indicate
that airline personnel are still handling the flying and ground operations,
and that the role of the military is that of protector and political advisor.
The latter role, of course, includes "weeding out the bad seeds and capi-
talists."
There is no organization chart available for GBCA, but discussions in
the Communist Chinese press of various offices and their responsibilities
indicate that its organization is much like that of the Soviet Ministry of
Civil Aviation and its airline, Aeroflot. Whereas Aeroflot has a territorial
administration for every Republic, however, GBCA has only six, which
they refer to as "Air Region Adjustment Organizations" (ARAOs) or
regional management bureaus. Each of these covers several provinces or
autonomous regions and is responsible for all local flights and supporting
services in its area, including line maintenance, fueling, and the operation
of the airfields, plus servicing the trunk route airplanes. The ARAOs
probably have departments to carry out the local and regional responsibil-
ities-much as line and station managers do in the organization of a United
States carrier.
GBCA is responsible for all civil aviation activities. It is administrator
and policy maker, and provides and operates the airports, navigational aids,
and maintenance facilities. It supervises CAAC's scheduled and nonsched-
uled passenger and cargo operations, agriculture, forestry, and emergency
flights, and the transporting of passengers, mail, and supplies to remote
regions.
IV. SPECIALIZED AVIATION
Because China is basically an agrarian nation, the need for nonscheduled
aviation support to agriculture and forestry has taken priority over sched-
uled services. About 200 to 250 single-engine aircraft (primarily An-2
biplanes, a few Li-2s, and a few helicopters) have been delegated to the
provinces by GBCA. This is a low number for the size of the job and the
country. The services performed include moving men, equipment, seeds,
and breeding stock to newly developing regions, planting fish in lakes,
aerial surveying and photography, flying fire patrols, and cropdusting. In
1967 China treated an estimated 4.9 million acres by air-about one-fifth
of the cultivated land.! This branch of civil aviation serves industry as
well by flying technicians, blueprints, instruments, and parts to industrial
areas.
Women pilots have been flying in the specialized services since 1952. A
number of articles have been written about their experiences while making
forest fire patrols, emergency medical flights, flood relief, and freight
carrying flights.
2 As a comparison, the United States treats about 74 million acres annually, and the Soviet
Union 153 million acres-both, of course, using many times the number of aircraft used in China.
In the United States, over 5000 planes are used in agriculture; in addition, the United States Forest
Service uses about 300 fixed-wing aircraft and 200 helicopters.
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V. SCHEDULED TRANSPORT SERVICES
A. Domestic Routes
In a country as large as China (nearly 750 million people in 3.8 million
square miles) where surface transportation is far from complete, the
demands on air transportation are probably greater than in most countries.
However, the size and operations of China's airline are entirely too small
to provide adequate service. In passenger operations, for example, only
200 to 250 planes provide scheduled services to only about 80 cities. Most
capitol cities have daily service to Peking, but flights to smaller cities and
towns are only made once or twice a week.
CAAC's growth has been hampered by a lack of long-range equipment
and by operational problems inherent in serving one of the largest and
most rugged countries in the world. As can be seen from Table 1, the
growth has been steady but not spectacular. A number of new routes were
added yearly, but not until the turboprops were received were long, non-
stop routes begun.
CAAC's total route mileage is now estimated to be 44,000 kilometers.
The major trunk routes serve 52 cities, the majority of them having popu-
lations of 100,000 and over; local routes give another 25 or 30 smaller
towns and cities scheduled air service. When opposition to the Cultural
Revolution developed in 1967, the airline canceled flights to many of the
troubled spots or continued them on a priority basis only. From October
1967 through June 1968 the Official Airline Guide (OAG) showed that
most flights to central and western China were "temporarily suspended."
It is puzzling that this was even admitted, and it apparently was the cause
.of some embarassment, for subsequent issues of the OAG have just listed
international schedules, and only nine domestic schedules. Air freight has
been especially affected because connecting rail and truck lines were often
severed. Reports of backlogged freight continued through the summer of
1968. Shortages of aviation fuel have also been reported at some airports,
resulting in canceled flights. With some order being restored in China at
this time and with the military still in control of civil aviation, schedules
may be returning to normal in most places.
B. International Routes
Civil aviation in many underdeveloped countries has grown pellmell,
with emphasis on the rapid growth of prestige-type airlines flying inter-
national routes. This growth has often been catastrophic and has necessi-
tated ietrenchment and replanning for the airline to survive! The Chinese
Communists, however, did not follow this precedent and chose to practi-
cally ignore international route development or the development of a flag
3 Heymann makes the point, "There seems to be an irresistible compulsion in many under-
developed countries to pursue illusions of grandeur and the trappings of national prestige. Their
political leaders, being under pressure to demonstrate quick dramatic progress, lavish attention on
the monumental development of'their capitol cities. An international airport, a palatial air terminal,
modern jet aircraft . . . these visible symbols of modernism are eagerly acquired with little regard
for cost or practicality . See Heymann, Civil Aviation and U.S. Foreign Aid: Purposes, Pitfalls,
and Problems for U.S, Policy, the RAND Corporation, R-424-RC, Jan. 1964, pp. 20-21.
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carrier. They have, in fact, been deliberate and slow in expanding air serv-
ice. CAAC operates only four scheduled international routes: Rangoon,
Burma; Hanoi, North Vietnam; Pyongyang, Nort Korea; and Irkutsk,
USSR. China's self-imposed isolationism and the shortage of long-range
equipment, plus the expense of operating international routes, have prob-
ably influenced these restrictions.
This is not to say that China has no interest in air agreements. On the
contrary, she has been making agreements with other countries since 1955,
including Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and including all of her southeastern
neighbors except India and Thailand. China seems to prefer to let carriers
of other nations handle most of the international traffic. Pakistan Inter-
national Airlines and Royal Air Cambodge were the first non-Communist
airlines allowed to fly into Communist China, beginning service to Canton
and Shanghai in 1964. Indonesia's airline, Garuda, became the next to
serve China, opening a route from Jakarta to Canton in early 1965. This
service was discontinued in the fall of 1967 when the two countries broke
diplomatic relations. Air France began service into Canton and Shanghai
on 20 September 1966. Aeroflot's service to Peking is now irregular but
CAAK, North Korea's newly designated airline, flies into Peking once
a week.
Japanese interest are also quite eager for a route to China. A group of
Japanese businessmen have been trying to get permission from both their
government and from China to begin air service between a southern city
in Japan and Shanghai. China was asked in 1965 for permission to operate
nonscheduled services, and it is understood that the request was renewed
informally this summer during talks in Peking, but without success.
As to reciprocal agreements, the Chinese Communist government and
the government of Ceylon discussed air service as far back as 1961. Both
sides signed their conference papers, but no further progress has been
reported. A tentative agreement was reached in May 1965 with the United
Arab Republic for service to China, but details have not been announced
nor have negotiations continued. Talks were begun about the same time
with Afghanistan, although in this case the details of an agreement may
still be under discussion. CAAC flew a trial run over the proposed Peking-
Urumchi-Kabul-Karachi route as long ago as March 1965, using a four-
engine I1-18 turboprop.
It is easy to speculate on reasons for the Chinese decision to avoid a large
international airline. Perhaps the leaders feel that China's past glories and
present power are well known without advertising it by having a flag
carrier; perhaps they are waiting until they have more long-range trans-
ports or until some are built in China; perhaps it is their general distrust
of the outside world. But whatever the reason, Chinese Communist civil
aviation has gone beyond the borders only to the minimum extent needed
for Chinese official travel, even when reciprocal rights to other countries
have been available. CAAC could have expanded beyond these limits had
Chinese Communist policy so desired.
Another point to be kept in mind is that an international airline is
[Vol. 3 5
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expensive to set up and operate. At the time that the Soviet Union would
have furnished equipment, CAAC did not have the technical personnel
or ground support equipment needed; and by the time it had gained these
essentials, the Soviet Union had withdrawn most of its aid. Most developing
countries can count on foreign aid and credit to establish their interna-
tional airlines, but China is limited in this area. The immediate costs or
"down payment" for an international airline have, therefore, been higher
for Communist China than for many other countries.
C. Passenger Operations
Although China scorns the international organizations such as IATA and
ICAO, most of the airline passenger operations such as ticket sales, weight
limits on baggage, passenger handling, and refreshments in route, follow
those of other airlines. Of course, CAAC does not patronize aviation under-
writers but it apparently does subscribe to some idea of passenger liability.
On domestic flights, for example, an added charge is a compulsory insur-
ance premium at the rate of 0.5 percent of the published fare.
On board the aircraft a stewardess announces the route and altitude to
be flown, time enroute, and estimated time of arrival. Passengers have
remarked that among the most agreeable features of the cabin service is
the frequent provision of wet towels-cold in the humid south, hot in the
cooler north. The aircraft are spotlessly clean. The Cultural Revolution
brought about a change in aircraft interior decor, however. All planes now
have a large portrait of Mao Tse-tung mounted at the front of the cabin
and placards of his sayings around the walls. The stewardesses hastily
perform their duties and then read and sing the displayed quotations. On
many flights the cabin becomes a classroom in which the more devout
pasengers may learn the sayings from the little red book or discuss revolu-
tionary thought.
There has been no clue in official reports as to the number of passengers
carried or the passenger-kilometers. A freeze was put on these and other
statistics in 1958. Even the 1958 figures are suspect, so it is extremely haz-
ardous to estimate such data. Noting that the routes have been expanded
(as noted in news bulletins), we can only assume that passenger and cargo
figures have also increased somewhat.
Passenger traffic on CAAC will probably not increase to any great extent
unless the government and the newly created Revolutionary Committees
make changes in their travel policies. We have no way of knowing what
percentage of workers is being moved by air to new locations, but this
could be increased at any time since these people are relocated at govern-
ment expense. Air travel, even with a cut in fares is beyond the reach of
many workers, who, with per capita incomes of about $100 per year, will
continue to travel by bus or train. Probably the primary factor in deter-
mining domestic transport growth will be the extent to which the regime
decides that it is better to have key people use air travel rather than take
surface transport or do business by mail. We do not know enough about
the Chinese Communist attitudes toward business travel to be able to pre-
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dict aviation growth on this basis, but it seems that an increase in official
travel rather than personal travel will determine the growth of civil air
traffic.
This does not,'of course, preclude the resumption of non-official travel
in small volume, particularly travel by foreign tourists, journalists, and
delegations, and so on. The regime can always relax travel restrictions
where airline capacity is not fully utilized for official travelers, add flights
to places that Party officials want foreigners to visit, and the like. It is also
quite possible that a relaxation of Chinese Communist ideology on incen-
tives for workers might lead to developing a small domestic tourist trade
in which the Chinese equivalent of the USSR's Stakhanovite workers would
be flown to tourist resorts. But predicting the probability of such a develop-
ment involves predicting the evolution of Chinese Communist ideology,
which is even more hazy than the future of official travel on CAAC.
VI. CIVIL AIRFIELDS
Although the development of civil aviation in Communist China has
been slow, the industry gets its share of funds for capital construction,
most of which go into new or extended runways. Many airfields with paved
runways were constructed in northeast China in the pre-Communist
period by the Japanese, and in southern China by the Americans. Many of
these airfields are still in use and have been expanded. Except for those
airfields serving international flights and those used jointly with the mili-
tary, few have adequate night lighting or all-weather facilities.
The best-equipped civil airports in China are Shanghai and Canton.
They have paved runways, navigational aids, and complete lighting facil-
ities. The terminals, beautifully landscaped and with sculptured gardens,
have modern shops, snack bars, barber shops, dining rooms, banks, and
post offices. During 1966, before travel was restricted, western visitors
reported that they were greeted courteously at all airports, that their bag-
gage was handled well, and that the planes were on time. Since 1967, Red
Guards and other revolutionary groups have often been present at the
terminals to "entertain" the waiting passengers with songs and recitations
of.Mao Tse-tung.
VII. EQUIPMENT
The Chinese airline still depends on the USSR for most of its aircraft.
Estimated Soviet equipment in use today includes: twenty-eight Li-2s,
five II-12s, five PS-84s (similar to Li-2s), fifty II-14s and fourteen Il-18s(including five ordered in 1967). A report in 1965" said that China had
purchased two An-24s, two Tu-124s, and five Mi-6 helicopters, with
delivery to be made in late 1965, but it is not known whether these were
intended for civil or military use. If they were delivered, the Tu-124s would
be the first jet transports for China. The first break from sole dependence
on Soviet equipment occurred in 1961 when six British Vickers Viscount
'CHINA TRADE REP ORT 23 (Sept. 1965) (Published by FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW.)
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turboprops were purchased. These were delivered in 1963 and 1964 and
serve as the backbone for the long-distance, non-stop routes.
CAAC also uses a variety of small (5 to 10 passenger) propeller-driven
aircraft, largely based on Soviet designs and built in China under license.
These include about 300 An-2 single-engine biplanes (about 200 of which
are used by the Specialized branch), 50 Peking and 10 to 15 Capital twin-
engine monoplanes, the latter based on the An-14. There are about fifteen
Mi-4 helicopters in use, also built in China under license from the USSR.
In 1967 China purchased French Sud-Aviation Alouette jet helicopters,
some perhaps for military use. If all the aircraft ordered are used in the
civil fleet, CAAC would have a total fleet of about 35 helicopters and 480
fixed-wing aircraft, only 22 of which fall in the long-range category.
The Chinese Communists seem to have made very little progress in
establishing a transport aircraft industry. Although several aircraft fac-
tories are known to exist, China admits to only the Shenyang plant. This
plant has been building both civil and military aircraft for a number of
years. There is still some reliance on imports for many parts, including
radios and instruments, and even some engines have had to be imported.
Although tires were imported for a time, the rubber industry now reports
that it can supply enough tires for domestic use. This probably includes
aircraft tires of all sizes, although it is doubtful that there is much, if any,
production of synthetic or oil-resistant rubber as yet.
With only small imports of aviation equipment possible, the growth of
aviation manufacturing must depend on the progress of allied industries:
aluminum, plastics, steel, instruments, petroleum, to name a few. These
were begining to develop in the late 1950's, but when in 1960 the Soviet
Union withdrew both its technical and material aid, many of these indus-
tries nearly ground to a halt. They had nearly recouped and were increasing
their output by 1966-1967, only to be slowed down again by the antics
of the Cultural Revolution. The present state of both aircraft and spare
parts manufacturing is not known.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As a new sense of order and control is established in China, it is antici-
pated that resources for the expansion of aviation will become available.
Once additional long-range equipment can be obtained and other aging
equipment replaced, it will not be surprising to see CAAC exercise some
of its bilateral agreements and sign others. On the domestic front, growth
will continue to be slow, with perhaps improvements in schedules and
local services as the first order of business. Emphasis will still remain, how-
ever, on the Specialized Services in support of agriculture and industry.
Even when CAAC expands, it seems unlikely to become a major competitor
in world aviation, although it will make continuing attempts to impress
neighboring countries. In the meantime, a careful watch of what is going
on in aviation offers clues to the outcome of the Cultural Revolution and
the success or failure of the central regime and the Revolutionary Commit-
tees in the provinces.
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